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The most important development for the Texas criminal law practi-
tioner was the adoption of legislation that vested criminal appellate juris-
diction in the fourteen courts of appeals.' The legislation was designed to
lighten the burden on the court of criminal appeals by giving that court
discretionary control over its own docket, except in capital cases. 2 No cases
from the courts of appeals were reported during the survey period, but
Texas lawyers may expect a proliferation of authority, and inevitable con-
flicts among the supreme judicial districts.
The division of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
effective October 1, 1981, should also be noted.3 The purpose, as with the
state judicial reorganization, was to remedy the case overload in the for-
mer Fifth Circuit. The "new" Fifth Circuit includes only Texas, Missis-
sippi, Louisiana, and the District of the Canal Zone, while Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia comprise the Eleventh Circuit.4
II. ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
Not every confrontation between law enforcement and civilians can be
characterized as an arrest.5 Even a brief investigatory stop, however, con-
stitutes a seizure of the person and, therefore, is subject to fourth amend-
ment scrutiny.6 In United States v. Cortez7 the Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutional standards of search and seizure as applied to the stop of
a camper truck that resulted in a prosecution for transporting illegal
aliens.8 The Court held that "[b]ased upon [the] whole picture the detain-
* B.S.F.S., J.D., Georgetown University. Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Meth-
odist University.
1. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 4.01, 4.03, 4.04 (Vernon 1982). The legislation
implemented a constitutional amendment approved November 4, 1980. See TEX. CONST.
art. V, §§ 5, 6.
2. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.04, § 2 (Vernon 1982).
3. See Pub. L. No. 96-452, 95 Stat. 1994 (1980) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41);
Baker, Precedent Times Three.- Stare Decisis in the Divided Ffth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687
(1981).
4. See Baker, supra note 3, at 687.
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
6. Id. at 16. The Court stated that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id.
7. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person stopped of criminal activity."9 This standard initially
requires that a determination must be made on the totality of the circum-
stances, including objective observation, and knowledge of the mode of
operation of certain kinds of law breakers. Such facts may support infer-
ences by a trained officer, more than inferences drawn by a lay person. In
addition, the facts and inferences must raise a particularized suspicion
concerning the person being stopped.' 0
Police officers must not only be able to articulate the facts which support
reasonable suspicion, but their actions also must remain within the author-
ized scope of Terry v. Ohio.'' The mere report of a "disturbance," for
example, does not authorize a stop near the place of the reported trouble,
nor does it permit an accompanying vehicle search.' 2 The types of police
action that constitute a stop also have been considered by the court of
criminal appeals. In Merideth v. State the court held that an officer's ap-
proaching and knocking on the window of a pickup truck was not a stop. ' 3
The officer's subsequent observation of the odor of marijuana, therefore,
was permissible, without examining the basis for his approach to the
truck.' 4 Judge Phillips, concurring in the result, disagreed, noting that a
"stop" may occur whether the person is moving or not when approached. ' 5
He agreed with the majority's result, however, finding that Merideth's
presence in a parking lot in a high crime area at 3 a.m. justified his deten-
tion by police. 16 If the person approached by the officers voluntarily coop-
erates, and there is no restraint,' 7 then no fourth amendment constraints
are implicated. An officer in such a situation observes from a legitimate
vantage point and, therefore, anything he sees in plain view may be
seized. '8
In Payton v. New York the United States Supreme Court held that an
9. 449 U.S. at 418. See also Hull v. State, 613 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
10. 449 U.S. at 418.
I1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court in Terry held that the officer must demonstrate "spe-
cific and articulable facts" that would indicate to a reasonable person that such action was
appropriate. Id. at 21-22. Furthermore, "evidence may not be introduced if it was discov-
ered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation." Id. at 29. In McMillan v. State, 609 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980), an officer's conclusions that taillights of a car he had stopped were similar
to those of a car that he had been following previously and that "it was probably the same
vehicle" were held insufficient to justify a stop. Id. at 786. The court stated that an "inartic-
ulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith" would not be enough to warrant the stop. Id. See
also Baldwin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (detention based on
suspicious person call absent evidence of traffic violation was nothing more than a "mere
hunch" of potential criminal activity).
12. Rodriguez v. State, 613 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
13. 603 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 873-74 (Phillips, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 873.
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 692 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
18. Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (officer noticed pistol
through slit in defendant's jacket as defendant voluntarily accompanied officers out of bar).
See also Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (officer must be in legiti-
mate position to view, and evidentiary value must be "immediately apparent").
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arrest warrant was required to enter the home of the person to be ar-
rested.' 9 Whether an officer has the authority to enter the home of a third
person in order to arrest a suspect, however, was left undecided by Pay-
ton.20 Last term, in Steagald v. United States, the Court held that, absent
exigent circumstances, a search warrant is required in order to enter a
house to arrest someone who does not live there. 2'
When a warrant is issued for either an arrest or a search probable cause
must be established.22 The affidavit must provide an independent basis
from which the magistrate can make a determination of probable cause. 23
If the affidavit includes assertions from an unidentified informer, both the
informer's credibility and the basis of his information must be demon-
strated to the magistrate. 24 In Carmichael v. State the court of criminal
appeals reversed a marijuana possession conviction because, although the
informer's credibility had been sufficiently established, the underlying cir-
cumstances for his conclusion were not detailed.25 The court noted that
corroboration of the informant's statements was required in addition to a
showing of the informant's reliability.26 This corroboration was missing in
the officer's affidavit. The inclusion of detailed information as to the loca-
tion of the contraband did not save the affidavit because no statements
were made regarding the circumstances of the informer's knowledge of
that fact.27
An affidavit containing false statements, made either knowingly or with
reckless disregard of the truth, must be evaluated without those state-
ments.28 The false statement must be made by the affiant; therefore if the
affidavit includes a false statement by the informer, no fourth amendment
violation has occurred if the affiant had no reason to believe that the infor-
mation was false.29
The standard of probable cause is at least as stringent for warrantless
searches as it is for the issuance of a warrant. In Barber v. State30 the state
19. 445 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1980). See also TEX. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1982) (authorizing arrest without a warrant for assault resulting in bodily
injury, where there is probable cause to believe there is immediate danger of further bodily
injury).
20. 445,U.S. at 583.
21. 101'-. Ct. 1642, 1648, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 48 (1981).
22. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969).
23. Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (capital murder convic-
tion reversed; affidavit merely conclusory).
24. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 114 (1964).
25. 607 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
26. Id. at 538.
27. Id. at 538-39. Because the affidavit underlying the warrant was insufficient, the in-
troduction of the marijuana seized under the warrant was error and the convictions were
reversed. Id. at 539.
28. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
29. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The court noted that the
credibility of the witnesses contesting the affidavit is an issue for the trial court to determine.
Id.
30. 611 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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argued that the following facts constituted probable cause to search: (1) a
citizen's report of suspicious activity, (2) defendant's attempt to leave after
the officers began to question, (3) an outstanding traffic warrant, (4) a
claim that the trunk key was lost, and (5) the subsequent discovery of the
key. The court of criminal appeals concluded, however, that these facts
were not adequate justification for a warrantless search. 3'
Searches without a warrant are legal under the fourth amendment if
they fall within an established exception to the warrant requirement. 32
Several of these exceptions were considered by federal and Texas courts
during the survey period. Administrative searches are permissible without
a warrant meeting the most stringent fourth amendment requirements, so
long as the regulatory scheme provides adequate substitute protection. 33
Last Term, in Donovan v. Dewey,34 the Supreme Court approved warrant-
less inspections of mines under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977.35 The Court noted that owners of mines have a lesser expectation of
privacy, and that an important federal interest in regulating a hazardous
industry existed.36
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also permissible without a war-
rant.37 A search of the person of the arrestee is justified,38 as is a search of
the area within the arrestee's immediate physical control.39 In New York v.
Belton a plurality of the Supreme Court announced a per se rule that,
incident to the arrest of occupants of an automobile, its passenger com-
partment may be searched. 4° Any container may be searched, since it is
within the Court'sper se definition of the area within the arrestee's imme-
diate control. Although Belton and others were outside the car, the Court
approved the search of a zippered pocket of Belton's jacket that was in the
back seat of the car.4 ' When a search exceeds the scope of the arrestee's
immediate physical control, it cannot be legitimated as a search incident to
arrest. The search of other rooms of an apartment in which an arrest has
taken place is permissible for the arresting officer's protection, if for exam-
31. Id. at 68.
32. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 381 (1976) (Powell, J. concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). See generaly 2 & 3 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978).
33. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
34. 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981).
35. Id. at 2536, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 267. The Act is codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp.
III 1979).
36. 101 S. Ct. at 2539, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 271. The Court cited the legislative history of the
Act that recognized the need for unannounced inspections in order to encourage compliance
with federal regulations. Id. at 2540, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 271.
37. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
38. Id.; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
39. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The rationale for this rule is the
prevention of the defendant seizing a weapon or destroying evidence. Id.
40. 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2865, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775 (1981).
41. Id. at 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 776.
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pie, the officer has reason to believe accomplices are present. 42
When police have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains
evidence, generally it may be searched without a warrant.43 In Montez v.
State a panel of the court of criminal appeals held that the search of a
parked automobile was improper because "exigent circumstances have not
been shown to exist."" The officer had taken the keys to the car, and
anyone who might move it or remove evidence from it was in custody.
The en banc court reversed, holding that the automobile exception did ap-
ply because the search was authorized and sufficient exigent circumstances
existed.45
The legitimacy of searches of containers found within an automobile is
uncertain. In United States v. Chadwick the Supreme Court held that a
locked footlocker could not be searched without a warrant once it was
securely in police control.46 Two years later, in Arkansas v. Sanders, the
same result was reached in a case involving the seizure of luggage from the
trunk of a car.47 Last year, in Robbins v. California, the Court adhered to
the same reasoning, and invalidated the search of containers seized from
the trunk of a car stopped for speeding.48 After the stop the officer noted
the odor of marijuana, and searched the entire car, seizing two opaque
packages from the trunk and opening them.
In 1978, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a "murder scene excep-
tion" to the warrant requirement. 49 The court of criminal appeals con-
cluded that the decision rejecting that exception should not be applied
retroactively, and accordingly upheld the search of a murder scene pursu-
ant to previous Texas authority.50
42. Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The standard applied
is whether a reasonable person would believe that his safety or the safety of others was
threatened. Id.
43. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (automobile stopped for speeding;
contents in plain view); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile searched
after arrest of occupants for armed robbery); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(automobile searched on highway based on official's information that it contained whiskey).
But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (automobile searched several
times long after defendant's arrest).
44. 608 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
45. Id. at 218. On rehearing, the court discussed extensively the recent Supreme Court
case Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980), in which the warrantless search of a car was
upheld because the officer had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a
crime. 608 S.W.2d at 217-18. Other factors that weighed in the Montez court's decision
included the expectancy that the appellant would leave in a short time, the fact that officers
already had a warrant to search his residence and to arrest him, and the reliability of the
informant who gave them information. Id. at 217.
46. 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). The Court stated that "[n]o less than one who locks the doors
of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is
due the protection of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause." Id.
47. 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979). See also United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.
1980).
48. 101 S, Ct. 2841, 2847, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744, 752 (1981). The Robbins decision has been
effectively overruled by the Court's recent decision in United States v. Ross, 50 U.S.L.W.
4580 (U.S. June 1, 1982).
49. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978).
50. Swink v. State, 617 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
1982]
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A search performed with valid consent relieves the prosecution from the
strictures of the fourth amendment.5' The state must show, however, that
consent was voluntary and not mere acquiescence to authority.52 The dis-
play of a weapon by the officer "requesting" consent is a significant factor
in assessing voluntariness.53
If there is a fourth amendment violation, any evidence obtained by ex-
ploitation of the violation must be excluded.54 The taint of an illegal de-
tention is not removed merely by the recital of Miranda warnings. 55 In
Green v. State,56 after concuding that the arrest was illegal, the court of
criminal appeals analyzed the connection between Green's arrest and his
later incriminating statements. The court did not disturb the trial court's
finding that the statements were voluntary, but held that no intervening
events affected the connection between the illegality of the arrest and the
subsequent statements.5 7 Accordingly, the court held that the admission of
the statements into evidence was error.58 In dissenting on the issue of re-
hearing, Judge McCormick argued that suppression was not required be-
cause the good faith of the officers, together with the Miranda warnings,
was "sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest." 59
As a matter of federal law, exclusion of evidence is not required if it be
seized pursuant to an arrest under a statute later held unconstitutional. 60
In Howard v. State the court of criminal appeals ordered the suppression
of evidence in such a case, on two grounds.6' First, the court reasoned that
Michigan v. DeFillippo62 had left open the possibility of suppression when
the law was "grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional. '63 The court of crim-
inal appeals held that the Austin ordinance prohibiting loitering was such
an unconstitutional law because of its overbreadth and vagueness. 64 Alter-
natively, the court ordered suppression "as a matter of state law, indepen-
dently of the standard announced in DeFillfvpo .,65 The court, both in its
original en banc opinion, and in its opinion denying the state's motion for
51. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
52. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). See Martin v. State, 610
S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
53. Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
54. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
55. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
602-03 (1975).
56. 615 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see note 23 supra and accompanying text.
57. 615 S.W.2d at 709. The court found the only intervening occurrence to be that
police drove the defendant around for two hours after his arrest, before taking him to the
jail. 1d.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 712 (McCormick, J., dissenting from denial of leave to file motion for rehear-
ing). See also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1127 (1981); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule.-
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981).
60. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
61. 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
62. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
63. 617 S.W.2d at 192 (quoting 443 U.S. at 38).
64. 617 S.W.2d at 192.
65. Id. at 193; see Baker v. State, 478 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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rehearing, relied upon the Texas Constitution 66 and upon the state's own
statutory exclusionary rule enacted in 1925.67 Counsel prosecuting and
defending criminal cases are well advised to note the applicability of state
law.6
8
Electronic eavesdropping is now approved for certain areas of law en-
forcement in Texas. House Bill 360,69 approved June 1, 1981, authorized
the issuance of an order permitting the interception of wire or oral commu-
nications when there is probable cause to believe that the communications
will provide evidence of commission of a felony under either the Texas
Controlled Substances Act 70 or the Texas Dangerous Drug Act.7 1 Elec-
tronic eavesdropping previously had been permitted only when one of the
parties to the conversation consented.72
III. CONFESSIONS
Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended by
each of the last three legislatures. The most recent amendment removes
the requirement that an electronically recorded statement be witnessed by
at least two persons.73 In addition to complying with statutory provisions,
a defendant's statement must also satisfy constitutional restrictions to be
admissible. A confession must be voluntary, and if the defendant makes
uncontroverted allegations of coercion, the confession is automatically
inadmissible. 74 A confession may be involuntary because of inducement
as well as coercion. If the confession is the product of inducement, any
evidence discovered as a result of it, and any subsequent confession that is
the product of the initial illegal confession, must be suppressed. 75
Besides the voluntariness requirement, a statement by a suspect must be
taken in compliance with Miranda v. Arizona.76 The protections guaran-
teed by Miranda apply to pretrial psychiatric interviews, even when the
statements are introduced only at the penalty stage of the trial. In Estelle v.
Smith, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas death sentence, because
66. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 19.
67. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979). See 617 S.W.2d at 193.
68. See White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (refusing to rule on state
law question since it had not been urged at trial).
69. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1982). The bill also
amended the Penal Code, by adding unlawful electronic eavesdropping as a second degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982). The statute expires on
September 1, 1985.
70. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1982). Felony
possession of marijuana is specifically excluded by the eavesdropping statute. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
71. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1982).
72. Rovinsky v. State, 605 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
73. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(5), repealed, 1981 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. ch. 271, § 1, at 711. The new version of article 38.22 also provides that the record-
ing must be preserved until the conviction is final, direct appeals are exhausted, or the stat-
ute of limitations has expired.
74. Barton v. State, 605 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
75. Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142, 143 ('rex. Crim. App. 1981).
76. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
1982]
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statements made by Smith to a psychiatrist at a pretrial competency exami-
nation were the basis for the psychiatrist's later testimony that the defend-
ant posed "a continuing threat to society."'77 The psychiatrist had not
advised Smith of his right to remain silent, nor had he sought permission
from Smith's attorneys to conduct the interview. The Court held that
statements to the psychiatrist were testimonial, and that psychiatric inter-
views were not insulated from fifth amendment protection. 78 Interrogation
of a suspect may also violate the sixth amendment if adversary judicial
proceedings have been instituted. 79 Although the attorney may not have
the right to be present at a psychiatric examination,80 he must be notified
in advance and given the opportunity to advise his client whether to sub-
mit, and to limit the use of the results of the examination. 8'
Although Smith indicated the vitality of Miranda even outside the sta-
tionhouse, in another case last Term the Supreme Court summarily re-
versed a California appellate court's reversal of a conviction for failure to
comply precisely with Miranda.82 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled
that the exact formulation of the warnings need not be recited, as long as
the substance of the rights is adequately conveyed.8 3
The fifth amendment rights under Miranda may of course be waived,
but "a heavy burden" is placed on the prosecution to establish waiver.84
Waiver need not be explicit, nor is a finding of waiver precluded by the
fact that the accused is already represented by counsel. In Stone v. State8s
defendant surrendered in the presence of his lawyer, who obtained an
agreement from the chief deputy sheriff that there would be no interroga-
tion in the lawyer's absence. Several hours after his arrest, Stone was re-
moved from his cell and taken to a wooded area where authorities were
searching for the body of an alleged murder victim. 8 6 The district attorney
was present, but was not told of the agreement that the defendant not be
interrogated in the absence of his lawyer. The prosecutor again advised
the defendant of his rights and inquired whether he wished to waive them.
Without expressly waiving his rights or relinquishing reliance on the
77. 101 S. Ct. 1866, 1870-71, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 366 (1981); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ArN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
78. 101 S. Ct. at 1873-74, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 370.
79. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
80. 101 S. Ct. at 1877 n.14, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 374 n.14; see Estelle v. Smith, 602 F.2d 694,
708 (5th Cir. 1979).
81. 101 S. Ct. at 1877, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 374.
82. California v. Prysock, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696, 702 (1981). The
Court noted that the Miranda opinion stated that its prescribed language or a functional
equivalent would suffice to preserve fifth amendment protections.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2810, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 100. The defendant had argued that the advice
did not clearly include the right to have appointed counsel at the interrogation. 101 S. Ct. at
2809, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 702.
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). See also North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369 (1979) (explicit waiver not required).
85. 612 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
86. Police had been denied the lawyer's permission to include the defendant in the
search. Id. at 544.
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agreement, the defendant nonetheless directed the searchers to the body.87
The court of criminal appeals held that a valid waiver of the fifth amend-
ment right to counsel had not been established.88 Stone had invoked his
right to counsel, subsequent interrogation took place, and no valid waiver
was shown; therefore, the conviction was reversed.89
Which specific Miranda rights are invoked by the defendant signifi-
cantly affects the finding of a waiver. If the suspect asserts the right to
remain silent, he may again be questioned and give a valid waiver.90 If the
accused requests counsel, however, a later response to questioning alone
will not establish a valid waiver.91 Further, if a request for counsel is
made, questioning must cease, and cannot be recommenced unless initi-
ated by the accused.92
After an accused is advised of the rights under Miranda and invokes
them, his silence cannot be used to impeach his testimony at trial.93 Also,
if an accused testifies at a pretrial hearing in order to assert a constitutional
right, he cannot be held to have waived fifth amendment rights, nor may
he be compelled to surrender one set of rights in order to assert another. 94
In Franklin v. State the en banc court of criminal appeals reversed a capi-
tal murder conviction because the prosecutor impeached the defendant
with the defendant's failure to relate an exculpatory story at the pretrial
hearing.95 The court relied upon the law of evidence as well as constitu-
tional principles, and upon Texas constitutional and statutory law, as well
as the United States Constitution.96 The court held that silence could im-
peach only if it occurred in a context in which the witness would have been
expected to speak, and that a pretrial hearing for a limited purpose was not
such a context. 97 The principle of Simmons v. United States9" was also
held to apply, and failure to testify beyond the proper scope of the pretrial
hearing was considered an invocation of fifth amendment rights. 99 Fi-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 545; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) (policies underly-
ing fifth amendment protections different from sixth amendment right to counsel). In Cas-
tillo v. State, 616 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), the defendant was arrested, and
requested appointed counsel when advised of his rights by the magistrate. Nonetheless he
was interrogated after his request. Although it was unclear whether the request for counsel
was for trial or interrogation, the court found that, at best, silence was the only response to
the question of waiver. Silence, the court held, was not enough. Id. at 622.
89. The Stone court rejected the argument that the error was harmless. 612 S.W.2d at
547-48. See also Germany v. Estelle, 639 F.2d 1301, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1981).
90. Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
91. Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981).
92. 101 S. Ct. at 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386.
93. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Cuellar v. State, 613 S.W.2d 494,
495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
94. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
95. 606 S.W.2d 818, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
96. Id. at 835, 848-50; see TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.08 (Vernon 1979).
97. 606 S.W.2d at 848-49. See also id. at 835 (Phillips, J., dissenting from panel opin-
ion, adopted by reference by the en banc majority).
98. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
99. 606 S.W.2d at 849; see id. at 836 (Phillips, J., dissenting from panel opinion).
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nally, the court found the Doyle v. Ohio 100 opinion persuasive even though
Doyle had expressly reserved the question of impeachment by silence at a
pretrial hearing. '0' The court of criminal appeals noted that, unlike Doyle,
fifth amendment rights clearly were exercised in Franklin. 102
An accused may be impeached by silence or failure to mention exculpa-
tory facts, if such a failure occurs before arrest and advice of rights. 0 3 He
may also be impeached by statements made after he has been advised of
his rights that do not include the later added exculpation. 104 When a de-
fendant chooses to speak, no reliance may be placed on the right to remain
silent, nor is his silence "insolubly ambiguous."105 If the defendant is not
faced with a tension between constitutional rights, he can be expected to
speak, and if he does not, his silence is probative, and admissible.10 6
IV. IDENTIFICATION
Two federal constitutional provisions impose restrictions upon identifi-
cation procedures: the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and the sixth amendment right to counsel. 10 7 The due process clause re-
quires that an identification be reliable, and reliability depends in part
upon the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.'08 The Fifth Cir-
cuit has established a two-part inquiry for testing identification proce-
dures; first, whether the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, and
second, whether the identification was reliable.10 9 Reliability depends
upon several factors, including the witness's opportunity to observe the
criminal, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of prior descrip-
tions, the level of the witness's certainty, and the time lapse between the
offense and the identification. I 10
A defendant has no constitutional right to demand a corporeal lineup
rather than a photographic array, even though the former is considered to
be more reliable."' A post-indictment photographic display may be con-
ducted in the absence of defense counsel, in part because the array can be
100. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
101. Id. at 616 n.6.
102. 606 S.W.2d at 849. The court also noted that this form of impeachment infringed
upon the accused's exercise of fifth amendment rights. Id.; see Griffin v. California, 380
S. 609, 615 (1965).
103. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
104. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980). See also Ayers v. State, 606 S.W.2d
936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
105. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
106. Williams v. State, 607 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
107. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (sixth); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 302 (1967) (fourteenth); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967) (sixth); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-40 (1967) (sixth).
108. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
198 (1972).
109. McGee v. Estelle, 632 F.2d 476, 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. Preacher v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
111. Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980).
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preserved and its fairness reviewed by the court. 12 When the police fail to
preserve the array, "there shall exist a presumption that the array is imper-
missibly suggestive." '" 3 Despite its suggestivity, an out-of-court identifica-
tion may still be reliable, and evidence of it admissible. 1 4 An in-court
identification may be permissible if it has a source independent of the ille-
gal identification procedure." 15
No federal constitutional requirement mandates that an evidentiary
hearing on identification testimony be conducted outside the presence of
the jury. 16 Since admissibility is dependent upon reliability, cross-exami-
nation can test it and effectively preserve the defendant's rights.' '7 Ex-
cluding the jury during the determination of the admissibility of
identification evidence is a prudent practice, and Texas has followed this
practice for over a decade.' 18
V. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to be represented by counsel includes the right to the effective
assistance of counsel, whether counsel is appointed or retained." 9 The
assistance provided must be "reasonably effective" in order to comply with
the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution 20 and
with the Texas Constitution.' 2' Counsel must make an independent inves-
tigation of the facts of the case, including seeking and interviewing poten-
tial witnesses.' 22 The lawyer should present all available evidence and
arguments in defending his client. 123 In Exparte Duffy 124 the counsel con-
ferred with his client only twice in more than three months, failed to inter-
view potential defense or state witnesses, failed to present an available
insanity defense, did not adequately prepare the defendant to testify, and
introduced damning evidence at the penalty hearing.' 25 The court, in a
thorough and thoughtful opinion, had little difficulty in invalidating the
conviction. 126
When counsel undertakes joint representation of more than one defend-
112. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317-21 (1973).
113. Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980).
114. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116-17 (1977).
115. Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
116. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1981).
117. Id. at 349.
118. Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (recommending
hearing outside of presence of jury). See also Britton v. State, 611 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980) (hearing outside jury's presence).
119. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932); Jones v. Estelle, 632 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Hurley v. State, 606 S.W.2d
887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
120. Exparte Ewing, 570 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
121. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 10.
122. Exparte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 516-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
123. Id. at 518. See also Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
124. 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
125. Id. at 516-25. Counsel apparently had solicited the representation. Id. at 510, 525.
126. Id. at 527.
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ant, counsel has the responsibility to advise clients of possible conflicts of
interest.1 27 A conflict of interest requiring reversal often will exist if one
defendant stands to gain from arguments or evidence that damage an-
other.' 28 The right to effective assistance of counsel also is implicated
when the lawyer discovers that the client intends to perjure himself. In
Maddox v. State the court affirmed a conviction in which defense counsel,
fearing the defendant intended to commit perjury, withdrew from repre-
sentation with respect to the testimony.' 29 The use of hybrid representa-
tion, which is permissible but not constitutionally required, is one possible
solution to this thorny problem.' 30
A defendant electing to represent himself must be permitted to do so. 131
Self-representation is not equivalent to waiver of the right to counsel,
which must be knowing and voluntary in order to be valid. 132 The court of
criminal appeals recently affirmed the conviction and jail sentence of a 76-
year old defendant with a fifth-grade education and impaired vision, hold-
ing that a voluntary waiver appeared from the record.1 33 The court over-
ruled Lisney v. State, 34 which required a warning of the dangers of self-
representation.1 35 Holding that a waiver of representation resulted from
the defendant's guilty plea rather than from self-representation, the court
affirmed the conviction for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors in a
dry county. 136
VI. CHARGING INSTRUMENTS
As usual, many decisions during this survey period invalidated convic-
tions because the indictments were defective.1 37 Competent drafting re-
quires careful reading of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 38 and of
the Texas Penal Code, 13 9 and sometimes more.140 An indictment must set
127. State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105, TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 app. (Vernon Supp. 1982). A conffict of interest also may arise
if an attorney defends in a cAse, and later prosecutes in a probation revocation. Ex parte
Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
128. See Gonzales v. State, 605 S.W.2d 278, 280-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). See also Ex
parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
129. 613 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
130. Id. at 286 (opinion on rehearing); id. at 287 (Teague, J., concurring). See also Phil-
lips v. State, 604 S.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (if "full representation" by
counsel is coupled with partial self-representation, detailed advice of dangers of the latter
not required).
131. Faretta v. California, 442 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975).
132. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
133. Id. at 122.
134. 574 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
135. 614 S.W.2d at 121.
136. Id at 119-20.
137. See Steele, Criminal Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 527, 537
(1981).
138. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon 1966).
139. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(13) (Vernon 1974).
140. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). In Moore, a prosecution
for aggravated sexual abuse, the indictment failed to include an allegation that the
threatened harm was imminent. The court relied, inter alia, on the practice commentary to
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forth the offense, including all of its essential elements.' 4 1 When a crimi-
nal omission is charged, the elements alleged must include a legal duty, 142
and valid custody must be alleged when an escape is charged.143
Most of the indictments that contaminated convictions, however, failed
to allege a culpable mental state.144 If an indictment contains an allega-
tion that property was taken with intent to deprive the owner of it, no
further allegation that the property was taken intentionally or knowingly is
necessary. 45 Inexcusably, indictments and informations continue to be
drafted that fail to conclude with the words, "[a]gainst the peace and dig-
nity of the State."146 Informations are also fundamentally defective if they
fail to allege the date of the offense. .7
The allegations in an indictment also must meet standards of specificity
and accuracy. In Compton v. State 48 the court, en banc, construed the
term "ownership" 'in reviewing an indictment for theft over $10,000.149
The majority approved the practicq.6f identifying a natural person as the
owner of property alleged to be stolen from a corporation, 150 and held that
"ownership" includes a greater right to possession than that of the
defendant's. 11
another section of the Penal Code. Id. at 925. See also Exparte Holbrook, 609 S.W.2d 541,
543-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (allegation of statutory language coupled with averment of
means is sufficient).
141. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(13) (Vernon 1974) (element includes con-
duct, culpability, result, and the negation of any exception); see also Exparte Pruitt, 610
S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. Crim. App, 1981) (Clinton, J., concurring).
142. Smith v. State, 603 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
143. Exparte Walling, 605 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). See also Ex Parte
Childress, 606 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (unlawful control over property;
must allege absence of owner's effective consent).
144. See, e.g., Exparte Luddington, 614 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (rob-
bery; must allege intent to appropriate); Exparte Lightfoot, 612 S.W.2d 935, 936 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981) (entry of a building; must allege intent to commit felony or theft within); Ex
parte Perez, 612 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (aggravated rape; must allege
culpable mental state); Exparte Pruitt, 610 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (aggra-
vated kidnapping; must allege intent to prevent liberation); Exparte Pullin, 608 S.W.2d 935,
936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (tampering with witness; must allege intent to influence witness);
Ex parte Holbrook, 606 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (unlawful possession of
forged driver's license; must allege intent to use); Exparte Santellana, 606 S.W.2d 331, 331-
32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (aggravated robbery; must allege intentional or knowing force or
threat). See also id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (calling for legislation to prevent relief
when the offense is "properly identified"); Koah v. State, 604 S.W.2d 156, 160 n.l (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980) (distinction between knowing and intentional is between reasonably cer-
tain result will occur and desiring result).
145. Minx v. State, 615 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
146. Exparte Warnell, 606 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). See TEX. CONST. art. V,
§ 12; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 21.02(8), 21.21(8) (Vernon 1966); Steele, supra note
137, at 537 n.107.
147. Exparte Hyett, 610 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (indictment must give
day, month, and year of commission of offense).
148. 607 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
149. Id. at 249; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(24) (Vernon 1974). Compton was
convicted of cashing a check that had been mistakenly drawn for $400,000 more than the
intended amount. 607 S.W.2d at 248.
150. 607 S.W.2d at 250. See Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976).
151. 607 S.W.2d at 250-51, overruling McGee v. State, 572 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Crim. App.
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The manner of alleging violations of the narcotics laws has presented
several problems during the survey period. Before the 1979 amendments
to the Controlled Substances Act, 152 for example, the drafter was required
to allege why cocaine was a controlled substance.153 Indictments after Au-
gust 27, 1979, need only mention cocaine;154 however, indictments before
the effective date of the Act were not revitalized by the amendment. 155
Similarly, an indictment for a dangerous drug offense, if a substance is not
listed as a dangerous drug, must allege that the drug is one that bears a
specific warning about legal restrictions. 156 An indictment for felony pos-
session of marijuana with intent to deliver must allege either that the deliv-
ery, 157 if any, was for remuneration or the amount of the remuneration.158
When an indictment alleges prior convictions for the purpose of enhanc-
ing punishment, it need not meet the same requirements of particularity as
one charging an original offense. 159 If the accused has notice of the prior
conviction relied upon by the state, minor inaccuracies will not taint the
sentence.160 If a motion to quash an indictment is raised in the trial court,
the indictment will be reviewed more strictly than if it is challenged for the
first time on appeal. 161 In the latter instance, an indictment will be invali-
dated only if it is so fundamentally defective as to state no offense at all. 162
An indictment, even if correctly drafted, is invalid if it is handed up by a
grand jury that does not represent fully all segments of the community. 163
In Espinoza v. State164 the defendant unsuccessfully challenged the com-
position of the grand jury. The court held that, although he had adduced
evidence about previous grand juries, he had not shown that the composi-
1978). See also Johnson v. State, 606 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), overruling
Commons v. State, 575 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
152. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
153. Id.; see Crowl v. State, 611 S.W.2d 59, 60-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (cocaine). See
also Exparte Tipton, 617 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (hashish); Exparte Hol-
brook, 609 S.W.2d 541, 544-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (Preludin).
154. See Turnipseed v. State, 609 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
155. See Exparte Perez, 618 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
156. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982). See Parrish v.
State, 614 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Tex..Crim. App. 1981).
157. See TEX. REV. GIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
158. See Tovar v. State, 612 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
159. Cole v. State, 611 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (variance in the cause
number not fatal). See also Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(opinion on rehearing) (indictment alleged previous conviction "upon an indictment," while
it had been upon information only), overruling Boone v. State, 450 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970), and Melancon v. State, 367 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
160. Cole v. State, 611 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), overruling Colvin v. State,
357 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962), and Green v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 273, 219 S.W.2d
687 (1949).
161. Compare Ellis v. State, 613 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (motion to quash
made at trial) with Griffin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (motion to quash
not filed t trial).
162. Franklin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); American Plant
Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1098
(1975).
163. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
164. 604 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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tion of the grand jury that indicted him was improper.165
VII. MISCELLANEOUS PRETRIAL ISSUES 1
66
A. Discovery
Material exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution 67
must be revealed to the defense upon request.' 68 In Iness v. State a di-
vided court of criminal appeals rejected a challenge to a rape convic-
tion.' 69 The victim was brain damaged and some uncertainty arguably
existed about the nature of the assault upon her. The majority held that
the information was either known by or accessible to defense counsel, and,
further that it was neither exculpatory, material, nor admissible.' 70 One
dissenter noted that the defense had made a request, the evidence would
have been favorable, and that the issue was crucial to the conviction. 7  A
second dissent observed that the requested report would have been of
assistance in the cross-examination of the prosecuting witness. 172
B. Bail
All prisoners are entitled to bail except those charged with a capital of-
fense "when the proof is evident."' 73 The state must establish that the evi-
dence is clear and strong, that the accused is the guilty party, and that the
jury would return findings requiring a death sentence. 174 When bail is set,
its primary purpose is to secure the defendant's appearance at trial.' 75 The
ability of the defendant to make bail is not the sole criterion in setting the
165. Id. at 909-10. But see id. at 910-14 (Clinton, J., dissenting) (state did not overcome
appellant's prima facie showing of discrimination).
166. Several recent legislative changes in this area are worthy of brief note. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982) was amended to permit the prosecution of
offenses committed at any jointly operated airport situated in two counties in either of the
counties. The legislature also established priorities for the trials of cases, thus affecting,
without amending, the Speedy Trial Act. Id. art. 32A.01. Hearings on temporary
injunctions take precedence over criminal cases. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a,
l(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The requirement that rape cases take precedence in all cases
as been repealed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.15 (Vernon Supp. 1982). A
defendant need no longer personally swear to a motion for continuance; any person with
personal knowledge of the underlying facts may do so. Id. art. 29.08.
167. See United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1980).
168. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (failure to disclose co-defendant's statement
that co-defendant strangled victim). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
(due process violated by failure to disclose evidence of substantial value to defense).
169. 606 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
170. Id. at 308. The suppressed evidence must meet all three criteria before reversal is
appropriate. Id.
171. Id. at 318-19 (Davis, J,, dissenting).
172. Id. at 324 (Clinton, J., dissenting). Unlike Judge Davis, Judge Clinton did not con-
sider significant the questions indicating that the jury had particular difficulty with the cross-
examination of the victim. Id. at 324.
173. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.07 (Vernon 1977).
174. Exparte Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The burden is on
the state to meet this test. Id.
175. Exparte Vance, 608 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Bail should not be so
high as to be oppressive. Id.
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amount; also to be considered are his criminal record, the nature of the
offense, and his community ties.176 While bail may be increased if a
change in circumstances occurs, a continuance alone is not sufficient
grounds to order an increase. 177
Bail pending a motion for new trial or an appeal is subject to more re-
strictions than pretrial bail. '7 8 In Mayo v. State the court vacated an order
increasing bail from $5,000 cash to $10,000 when the defendant had been
unable to make the pretrial bond.179 The court reviewed the punishment
assessed (the maximum of ten years) and the accused's financial situa-
tion 80 and concluded that the state had not met its burden of showing that
the original amount was insufficient to protect its "ambiguous interests."18'
At the same time, the court refused to reduce the original bail in the ab-
sence of formal motion or proof.'8 2
C. Former Jeopardy
No area of criminal procedure has become more complex or received
more attention from the United States Supreme Court in the past several
years than the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 83 This at-
tention has caused major adjustments in state criminal procedure. 84 Jeop-
ardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is sworn.' 8 5 The court of
criminal appeals has held that the federal rule of attachment is fully retro-
active, and that double jeopardy principles prohibit reprosecution even if
the conviction became final before the rule was explicitly applied to the
states. 86
After jeopardy has attached, no new trial may be held if the first trial is
aborted, unless the defendant consents or the first trial is terminated for
"manifest necessity."' 87 Consent to a mistrial is not established by a mo-
176. Id. (reduced $100,000 bail on each of two indictments to $10,000 each).
177. Ex parte King, 613 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (continuance
mandatory since defense counsel was member of legislature).
178. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(b)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982). Article
44.04 was amended by two separate acts of the 67th Legislature. Chapter 268 requires revo-
cation of bail when the defendant is convicted a second time for offenses violating the Con-
trolled Substances Act. Id. art. 44.04(b). Chapter 291 adds the motion for new trial to the
section. Id. art. 44.04(c).
179. 611 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
180. Id. at 444. Ability of the accused to make bail is a factor to be considered but is not
controlling. Punishment assessed is one of the most important factors. Id.
181. Id. The interests asserted by the state were the "interests of society" and assurance
that "justice will be met." Id. at 443.
182. Id. at 444-45. Appellant did not formally move to lower the original bail set by the
trial court. Id.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184. The clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Ma-
ryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1968).
185. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978).
186. Exparte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). See Illinois v. Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
187. Exparte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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tion for a mistrial made later in the case for a different reason 8 8 nor is it
implied solely by a failure to object to the court's ruling.' 89 A judge's
declaration of a mistrial must be supported by the circumstances. 190 When
a jury is deadlocked, a mistrial may be declared with the consent of the
parties, or when the court determines that the likelihood that the jury will
reach a verdict is "altogether improbable."' 191 The consent required is the
personal consent of the defendant, not that of his lawyer; 192 however, per-
sonal consent is not required when defense counsel requests the
discharge.' 93
The double jeopardy provision generally prohibits appeal by the prose-
cution after an acquittal, but prosecution appeals may be permitted on a
question of law. 194 If a state criminal proceeding is removed to federal
court, 195 the state's appellate rights are defined by state law. 196 Retrial
after a successful defense appeal or motion for new trial is not barred un-
less relief was granted because of insufficiency of the evidence. 197
VIII. PLEAS OF GUILTY
Article 44.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a defendant
who has been convicted on a plea of guilty, on the basis of a plea bargain
accepted by the court, to appeal only on matters raised by written pretrial
motion or with permission of the trial court.198 The focus of several opin-
ions during the survey period was upon the relationship between article
188. Torres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (basis for mistrial was
not appellant's prior motion for mistrial).
189. Id. at 441-42. Before defendant's failure to object to mistrial may be construed as
consent, he must be given adequate opportunity to object to the court's motion. Id.
190. Id. at 442-43.
191. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.31 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
192. Hipple v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 531, 537, 191 S.W.1150, 1153 (1917).
193. Bowles v. State, 606 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
194. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 44.04(h) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (amendment permitting state to seek discretionary
review in the court of criminal appeals); notes 298-300 infra and accompanying text; TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 26. A state may permit prosecution to appeal the sentence, since the con-
trolling concern is to protect against multiple trials. United States v. DeFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117 (1980). If the sentencing proceeding resembles a trial on guilt or innocence, where spe-
cific facts must be proven, however, an appeal may not be permitted. Bullington v. Mis-
souri, 101 S. Ct. 1852, 1861, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270, 283 (1981).
195. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1), 1443 (1976).
196. Arizona v. Manypenny, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1664, 68 L. Ed. 2d 58, 68 (1981). See also
Faulder v. Hill, 612 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (state constitutional and statu-
tory prohibition on state's right to appeal in criminal cases does not bar state petition for
certiorari in United States Supreme Court); notes 288-97 infra and accompanying text.
197. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16
(1978).
198. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979). The same provision ap-
plies after a plea of nolo contendere. Id. See Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981) (pre-trial motion to suppress preserved defendant's right to appeal). The accused
must be advised of this restriction before pleading. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
26.13(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982). See Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979) (plea of guilty waived claimed deprivation of constitutional guarantees against unrea-
sonable search and seizure).
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44.02 and the Speedy Trial Act, 199 which provides that a plea of guilty
waives the rights guaranteed by the Act. The court determined that a de-
fendant's statutory rights to a speedy trial were waived by his plea, while
his constitutional speedy trial rights were not.2z°
IX. MISCELLANEOUS TRIAL ISSUES
A. Right to Transcripts
When a first trial ends in a mistrial, an indigent defendant must be pro-
vided a transcript for a second trial, if it is needed for an effective de-
fense.20' A transcript of the testimony of the state's witnesses normally
will suffice, unless a particular need for testimony of defense witnesses is
shown.202 The request for transcript must be timely.203 A defendant does
not bear the burden of showing a particularized need for the transcript, nor
of showing that the alternatives are inadequate. 2°4 If the state decides to
oppose the request, it bears the burden of proof to show lack of need.
205
B. Jury Qualjfcations and Selection
In federal court the trial judge has considerable discretion over the con-
duct of voir dire examination. 20s Noper se rule exists requiring inquiry as
to racial prejudice, unless racial issues are intimately involved in the
trial.207 Failure to permit inquiry is reversible error only when there is a
"reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influ-
enced the jury."208
Although the court has discretion to control voir dire and to impose rea-
sonable restrictions upon its conduct, that discretion is not unlimited.2oo A
time limitation can be a reasonable restriction, but it cannot be unrealis-
tic. 210 Time limits are impermissible, however, if no apparent effort was
being made merely to prolong the process, and if the questions to be asked
199. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
200. Wooten v. State, 612 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding no plea
conditioned on the right to appeal a Speedy Trial Act violation should be accepted); see
Flores v. State, 606 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (guilty plea waives statutory right to
speedy trial unless right otherwise preserved).
201. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 230 (1971).
202. Billie v. State, 605 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). This limitation on the
right to a transcript has been questioned. See Cook v. State, 611 S.W.2d 83, 86 n.3 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981).
203. Cook v. State, 611 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (request at third continu-
ance too late); Billie v. State, 605 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Tex.,Crim. App. 1980) (ten days after
mistrial and three months before second trial timely).
204. Armour v. State, 606 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
205. Id. at 894.
206. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
207. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1976) (rejecting per se rule); see Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (special circumstances required asking racial
prejudice questions). See generally Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors.- Constitutional Limits on the
Right of Inquiry into Prejudice, 48 COLO. L. REV. 525 (1977).
208. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1636, 68 L. Ed. 2d 22, 30 (1981).
209. Clark v. State, 608 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
210. Id. at 669.
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were proper.21' The amount of time necessary to conduct the voir dire
examination depends upon the facts of each case.212 If a time limitation
precludes the asking of a proper question, thereby preventing the intelli-
gent use of a peremptory challenge, the limitation cannot be harmless
error.
213
The problem of disqualifying jurors who express reservations about the
death penalty continues to plague Texas courts.214 A prospective juror
who acknowledges having scruples against capital punishment and who
even admits that his deliberation will be affected cannot be challenged for
cause on that ground alone.215 The court of criminal appeals has ruled
that, in order to claim erroneous disqualification on appeal, a very specific
objection must be made on that particular ground at the time of the chal-
lenge.216 An objection based upon the statute that governs juror selection
in capital cases will not preserve the error.217
When jurors have been disqualified erroneously because of expressed
hesitations about the death penalty, the court of criminal appeals will re-
verse the conviction; it cannot simply reduce the sentence.218 The error
will not be held harmless even if the prosecution failed to exercise all of its
peremptory challenges. 219 Of course jurors may be disqualified for cause
if doubts about the death penalty would lead them to fail to follow the
court's instructions or to violate the oath.220
C Prosecutorial Misconduct
An improper comment or argument by the prosecutor can be reversible
211. Id.
212. Compare id. (30-minute limit improper) with Barrett v. State, 516 S.W.2d 181, 182
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (30-minute limit reasonable).
213. 608 S.W.2d at 670.
214. See Steele, supra note 137, at 544-45.
215. See Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). See also Ad-
ams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 47-50 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-23 (1968);
Granviel v. State, 655 F.2d 673, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1981).
216. May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (error not preserved by
objection under the statute); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (b) (Vernon 1974); Craw-
ford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (opinion on rehearing). See also
Granviel v. State, 655 F.2d 673, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1981).
217. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974). Considerable question ex-
ists whether the May decision is consistent with Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). See id.
at 48; May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 349-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Clinton, J., dissenting).
218. Evans v. State, 614 S.W.2d 414,417-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). See also Grijalva v.
State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Loudres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 407, 409
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Pierson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
The Evans court based its holding on TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.24(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1982) empowering the court of criminal appeals to make various decisions. 614
S.W.2d at 417. The 1981 amendments to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure may grant
the court the authority to reduce the sentence without reversing the conviction. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.24(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982). (amendment added "or may
enter any other appropriate order" to the options granted the appellate courts).
219. Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 423-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
220. Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
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error. In Hawkins v. State221 the defendant had been found competent to
stand trial, and after proper advice from the court, elected to represent
himself.222 The jury was selected carefully and instructed not to consider
the self-representation in any way.223 When Hawkins objected during the
testimony of a rebuttal witness who was a psychiatrist, the prosecutor
asked the witness to evaluate the mental state of the defendant, and the
witness did so over defendant's objection. The court held that "it is error
of constitutional dimension for the prosecutor or a witness to comment
adversely concerning the mental attitude of the accused" who is exercising
the right of self-representation. 224
If a prosecutor uses or refers to inadmissible evidence, reversible error
will be found only if there was a timely objection. In Johnson v. State225
no defense objection was made to testimony about a pistol nor to identify-
ing and displaying it to the jury. The pistol was later ruled inadmissible,
yet the prosecutor continued to refer to it and display it. The court held
that the objection and request for a mistrial was made too late. 226
Comment on a defendant's failure to testify is prosecutorial misconduct
and a violation of the right against self-incrimination. 227 Such a comment,
however, must have been "manifestly intended or was of such character
that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on
the accused's failure to testify." 228
A good faith basis is a prerequisite to impeachment by prior convic-
tions.229 Bad faith, concerning witness impeachment, has been defined as
actual knowledge that a conviction is not final.230 When a prosecutor re-
lied on an FBI report, he was held not to have such actual knowledge, even
though informed by the defense that the conviction was dismissed, since he
was free to disbelieve such assertions in the absence of documentary
proof.231
D. Instructions
Frequently, a trial judge is required to give an instruction, if requested.
221. 613 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
222. Id. at 724-25.
223. Id. at 725.
224. Id. at 729. The court went on to hold the error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 729-30. A prosecutor may also force a mistrial if he attempts to prejudice a
defendant by impugning the integrity of his lawyer. Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) (prosecutor argued that defense lawyer's "duty is to see that his client gets
off even if it means putting on witnesses who are lying"; held jury instruction insufficient;
error to deny mistrial); see Summers v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 519, 521, 182 S.W.2d 720, 722
(1944) ("striking at the appellant over the shoulders of his counsel" was held to be a denial
of fair trial).
225. 604 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
226. Id. at 131 (noting that the incident "reflects no credit on the prosecuting attorney").
227. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965). See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1977).
228. Nickens v. State, 604 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
229. Van Sickle v. State, 604 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).




In Carter v. Kentucky 232 the Supreme Court held that the fifth and four-
teenth amendments required the trial judge to honor a defense request to
instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from the de-
fendant's failure to testify.233 The defendant also is entitled to an instruc-
tion on his theory of the case if it is supported by evidence from any
source, regardless of whether the evidence is disputed or not credible. 234
This principle includes the right to an instruction on lesser included of-
fenses. 235 The defense raised need not be explicitly recognized by statute.
In Garcia v. State236 the defendant testified that the killing was accidental.
The court held that such testimony raised the issue of voluntariness, 237 and
even though the requested instruction was couched in terms of accident
rather than voluntariness, the court had erred in refusing it.238
An instruction must include all essential elements of the offense as al-
leged in the indictment.239 A jury charge cannot omit an essential element
of the offense. For example, in Williams v. State24° the defendant was in-
dicted for robbery by "placing" the victim in fear, while the jury was
charged that they could convict if they found that he "threatened or
placed" the victim in fear.24' The deviation from the allegations in the
indictment was held to be fundamental error.242 Although the court of
criminal appeals will reverse on unassigned error if such error is funda-
mental,243 the prudent practice is to make a timely objection on the record
to the charge. 244 In another case the court construed a statute to include
232. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
233. Id. at 302-03.
234. See Home v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556, 557-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (self-defense
raised by testimony of two witnesses); Gavia v. State, 488 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Crim. App
1972). The accused's own testimony may be sufficient. Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 683,
695-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
235. Cf. Kuykendall v. State, 609 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (criminally negli-
gent homicide lesser included offense of felony murder; defendant not entitled to a charge
when issue not raised by the evidence). See also Campbell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 443, 445
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
236. 605 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
237. Id. at 566; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(a) (Vernon 1974).
238. 605 S.W.2d at 566; cf. id. at 566-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing).
239. See Deitch v. State, 617 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (error to include
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter on theory not alleged in indictment);
Johnson v. State, 615 S.W.2d 753, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (indictment for operating a
vehicle while under the influence of a drug; instruction for being under the influence so as to
be rendered incapable of safely driving). See also Porter v. State, 605 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (failure to include culpable mental state). In a strong dissent from the
denial of a rehearing, Judge Douglas observed that the charge, taken as a whole, adequately
covered the element. Id. at 554-58. See Evans v. State, 606 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (aggravated robbery charge must include "in the course of committing theft").
240. 612 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
241. Id. at 935.
242. Id. See also Mims v. State, 612 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Moore v.
State, 612 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Infante v. State, 612 S.W.2d 603 604-05
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
243. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
244. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts, 36.14, 36.15 (Vernon 1982) (objection must
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the element of knowledge so as to hold the statute constitutional.245 The
court reversed the conviction for failure to include that element in the
charge.246 The elements of an offense must be included in the instruction
on each theory of conviction, both in the portion of the charge applying
the law to the facts as well as in the abstract portion.247
When the prosecution's evidence of one of the elements of an offense is
only circumstantial the court must include an instruction on circumstantial
evidence.248 The instruction is not necessary if direct evidence is presented
or if "the proven facts are so closely related to the ultimate fact . . . so as
to be the equivalent of direct evidence. ' 249 An instruction also must state
correctly the applicable law. In Rains v. State250 the court used a form
instruction on self-defense that complied with the current penal code.251
The offense, however, occurred before the effective date of that code, and it




When a jury, after retiring to deliberate, receives other evidence, a new
trial must be granted. 253 In Hunt v. State254 at the hearing on a motion for
new trial a juror testified that another juror had asserted personal knowl-
edge about the cause of death. Although other jurors could not remember
the comment, the failure to remember was held not to controvert the first
juror's testimony.255 Since cause of death was an issue that presented a
problem for some jurors, the court held that receipt of the "other evidence"
was detrimental to the defendant, and ordered a new trial.256
X. SENTENCING
In an appropriate case the court may defer further proceedings and
be written, or dictated into the record before charge delivered, but need no longer be
endorsed).
245. Ferguson v. State, 610 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.02 (Vernon 1974).
246. 610 S.W.2d at 471.
247. Medrano v. State, 612 S.W.2d 576, 577-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (criminal respon-
sibility for failure to prevent offense by another only if legal duty to prevent commission).
Failure to include the element in the application section must be preserved as error by objec-
tion. Id. at 578 n.2. It need not be so preserved if the instruction is erroneous, rather than
merely incomplete. Id.
248. Rodriguez v. State, 617 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
249. Id.
250. 604 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
251. Id. at 119; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (Vernon 1974); P. McCLUNG, JURY
CHARGES FOR TEXAS CRIMINAL PRACTICE 96, 96-97 (1976).
252. 604 S.W.2d at 119.
253. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.03(7) (Vernon 1977); Trevino v. State, 582
S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
254. 603 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
255. Id. at 868.
256. Id. at 868-69.
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place the defendant on probation without an adjudication of guilt.257
Since no judgment is entered, the deferral decision is not appealable.258
The Texas Constitution prohibits the grant of probation before conviction,
while the Code of Criminal Procedure permits it.259 In McNew v. State the
court of criminal appeals avoided the obvious conflict by holding that
"probation" as defined in the statute was not equivalent to "probation" as
defined in the constitution. 260 The 67th Legislature amended the proba-
tion statutes, and reorganized the Board of Pardons and Paroles.26' One of
the amendments permits a sentence be served so as to allow the defendant
not only to work, but also to seek employment or to obtain medical or
psychological treatment. 2
62
The Texas parole statute has survived a constitutional challenge in fed-
eral court. In Williams v. Briscoe the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas
system did not create an "expectancy of release," 263 distinguishing it from
the Nebraska provisions recently invalidated by the Supreme Court.264 A
constitutionally protected interest can be created only by statute or rule; it
does not arise solely from past practice.
265
Texas prison inmates brought a class action challenging the operation of
Texas prisons in Ruiz v. Estelle.266 Although the Texas prison case resem-
bles prison cases brought in other states, the Ruiz case differs in that the
defendant Texas Department of Corrections ("TDC") officials persisted in
denying each allegation of unconstitutional prison practice. Consequently,
in its opinion the federal district court cited detailed and extensive findings
of fact to substantiate its conclusion that certain TDC operations violated
the Constitution. The court in Ruiz found that overcrowding, 267 unsatis-
257. TEx. CODE CGRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42.12, § 3d(a) & 42.13, § 3d(a) (Vernon Supp.
1982). The amendment permits the imposition of a fine as condition of probation. Id. art.
42.12, § 3d(a). Another amendment provides for community service restitution probation.
Id. art. 42.12, § 6. Deferred adjudication is not authorized for certain violations of the
Controlled Substances Act. Id. art. 42.12, § 3f(c).
258. Richardson v. State, 617 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
259. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § II-A; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 2b,
3d(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
260. 608 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). See id. at 174, 177 (opinion on
rehearing).
261. TEx. CODE CGRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42.12, § 2 & 42.13 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
262. Id. art. 42.03, § 5.
263. 641 F.2d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1981); see TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1982).
264. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979).
265. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2464, 69 L. Ed. 2d 158,
165-66 (1981).
266. 503 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D. Tex. 1980),partialstay grantedpending appeal, 650 F.2d 555
(5th Cir. 1981).
267. 503 F. Supp. at 1277-88. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of prison over-
crowding as manifested by double ceiling in Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed.
2d 59 (1981). In Rhodes the Court held that double ceiling at the Southern Ohio Correc-
tional Facility did not result in a failure to meet the prisoners' food, medical care, and sani-
tation needs, nor did it cause or increase prison violence. 101 S. Ct. at 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d at
69-70. Thus, the Court found no violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment on the Rhodes facts. Id.
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factory security practices and inmate supervision,268 and substandard
health care269 in Texas prisons violated the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 270 The court concluded that TDC
operations violated the prisoners' fourteenth amendment right to adequate
disciplinary hearing procedures under the due process clause.27' Further-
more, the court found that the TDC restricted the inmates' access to the
courts as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment due process right and
the first amendment right to petition for the redress of grievances. 272 Fi-
nally, the Ruiz court held that prison practices violated the inmates' state
statutory rights to adequate fire safety, sanitation, work safety, and work
hygiene conditions. 273 In shaping relief for the plaintiff class, the court
ordered the development of a comprehensive prison remedial plan. 274 The
court indicated that the plan should provide for the alleviation of the con-
stitutional and statutory violations,275 prescribe structural changes to
prison facilities, 276 and mandate organizational changes in the prison sys-
tem.277 To ensure the successful implementation of the remedial plan and
the enforcement of present and future injunctive relief, the court provided
for the appointment of one or more special masters.278
XI. APPEAL AND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 279
An appeal may be taken for any assigned error, and for unassigned error
268. 503 F. Supp. at 1288-1307.
269. Id. at 1307-46.
270. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-66 (1962).
271. 503 F. Supp. at 1346-58. The due process clause provides that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See Hughes v. Rouse, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (prisoner's complaint that his due
process right had been violated by his placement in segregation without prior disciplinary
hearing should not have been dismissed).
272. 503 F. Supp. at 1367-73. The first amendment provides against congressional inter-
ference in the right "to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This portion of the first amendment was made applicable to the states in Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939).
273. 503 F. Supp. at 1373-83. The court also found that the TDC's failure to provide
adequate fire safety programs violated the inmates' eighth amendment rights. Id. at 1382-
83.
274. Id. at 1390.
275. Id. at 1387.
276. Id. at 1388-89.
277. Id. at 1387-89.
278. Id. at 1389-90.
279. Counsel should note carefully the legislation that conferred jurisdiction over
criminal appeals to the fourteen courts of appeals, and amended, inter alia, the appellate
procedure sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
4.01, .03 (Vernon Supp. 1982). See also Texas Rules of Criminal Appeals following TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.33 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
One interim measure is worthy of particular comment. Formerly, extensions of time for
the filing of transcripts, bills of exception and briefs were granted by the court of criminal
appeals or a judge thereof. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 40.09(16) (Vernon 1977)
(repealed). On May 14, 1981, effective that date, the legislature amended the provision to
allow the trial court the power to grant extensions. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 144, § 1, at 361.
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if such appeal is "in the interest of justice.' '280 In Bell v. State the en banc
court of criminal appeals granted the state's motion for rehearing, and
overruled the panel opinion that considered unassigned error. 28' The
panel had held that a point of error raised by Bell in hispro se brief re-
quired reversal even though the brief was not timely filed. 282 The claimed
error was impeachment of the defendant with a misdemeanor conviction
for possession of marijuana. 283 The en banc court held that the error was
neither of "constitutional dimension nor such a serious question of law
that 'justice' require[d] its discussion. 284
An appeal may be dismissed voluntarily only upon the sworn motion of
the appellant himself.285 In Exparte Trisler286 the court refused to grant a
voluntary dismissal, even though the motion was signed by the appellant
and his attorney. 287
The state's power to appeal sharply divided the court of criminal ap-
peals during the survey period. In Faulder v. Hi/ 288 the defendant sought
a writ of prohibition to prevent the state from filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that such a
petition violated the Texas constitutional ban on state appeals in criminal
cases.289 Eight opinions were filed in the case. The prevailing opinion
290
held that a writ of prohibition was the appropriate remedy to seek and was
not barred by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.29'
The opinion went on to hold that a petition for a writ of certioriari is an
On June 8, 1981, effective September 1, 1981, the legislature conferred the extension of
authority on the appellate court (or a judge thereof) in which the case will be filed. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09(13) (Vernon Supp. 1982). Presumably the later
amendment repeals the earlier one by implication.
280. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09(13) (Vernon 1977). This provision was
deleted by the legislature in 1981. The deletion may have been inadvertent. See Bell v.
State, 620 S.W.2d 116, 123 n.l (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (characterizing the deletion as a
"blunder").
281. 620 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
282. Id. at 118.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 126. The author of the panel opinion, in dissent, commented that "what is
reviewable 'in the interest of justice' seems to depend on the particular collective judgment
of the affected members of the Court at any given moment. Id. at 127-28 (Clinton, J.,
dissenting).
285. Exparle Trisler, 605 S.W.2d 619, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 619-20. The court considered the appeal on the merits and affirmed. Id.
Four members of the court dissented from the refusal to dismiss the appeal, noting that the
requirement of a sworn motion was now a creature of case law and not a rule of court. Id. at
620-21 (Odom, J., dissenting); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.33 (Vernon Supp.
1982).
288. 612 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
289. Id. at 513; see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 26; TEX. CODE CUM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
290. See 612 S.W.2d at 516 n.3 (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that only
three judges concurred in the "plurality" opinion).
291. Id. at 514 (federal law governs jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court,
while state law governs power of state to invoke that jurisdiction). Judge Douglas disagreed
on this point. Id. at 515.
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appeal.292 Finally, the opinion concluded that the Texas constitutional
provision prohibited appeals only within the Texas judicial system, and
did not prevent a petition for review in the United States Supreme
Court.293 The Court thereby overruled hite v. State.294 Judge Roberts
disagreed with the limited prohibition embraced by the prevailing opinion.
Relying on other articles of the Constitution and on the intent of the
adopters, he concluded that the state should have no right to petition for a
writ of certiorari.295.
In his comprehensive dissent, Presiding Judge Onion first criticized the
prevailing opinion for deciding the state constitutional question without
focusing on the statutory prohibition of appeal.296 He also discussed the
constitutional question, and castigated the majority for its exercise of "raw
judicial power-pure muscle" in limiting the appeal prohibition to pro-
ceedings within the state system.297
Eight judges of the court of criminal appeals agreed that a petition for a
writ of certiorari is an "appeal," as that word is used in the Texas Constitu-
tion.298 This conclusion casts considerable doubt upon the constitutional-
ity of the 1981 amendment to article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.299 The amendment provides that the statutory prohibition of
state appeals "shall not be construed to prevent the State from petitioning
the Court of Criminal Appeals to review a decision of a court of appeals in
a criminal case, on its own motion. '' 3°° If a petition for a writ of certiorari
is an appeal, then certainly a petition for discretionary review is also.
292. Id. at 514 ("review of the case, whether denominated an appeal, a writ of error, a
writ of certiorari, or any other name is still an appeal"). Judge Dally expressed doubt on
this point. Id. at 516, 5A (Daly, J., concurring in denial of rehearing).
293. Id. at 514-15.
294. 543 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
295. 612 S.W.2d at 516-17.
296. Id. at 517, 519 (Onion, P.J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 522 n.7. Dissenting from the denial of rehearing, Judge Onion challenged the
precedential value of the decision, since, he contended, it had been mooted by the Supreme
Court's denial of the State's petition. Id. at 528 n.l; see 449 U.S. 874 (1980) (denial of
petition for writ of certiorari); 611 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
298. See 612 S.W.2d at 514 (plurality opinion); id. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
516 (Roberts, J. concurring and dissenting); id. at 518-19 (Onion, P.J., dissenting); id. at 525
(Clinton, J., dissenting). See also TEx. CONST. art. V, § 26.
299. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
300. Id.
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